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CRIMINAL LAW COMMENTS
has been a tendency to carry its application to extremes. The minority
approach of Texas and Maryland seems the more desirable; in other
words, a waiver of the right of confrontation should be permitted only
when personally requested by the accused, and when he has a full under-
standing of the consequences.13 Three problems are raised in each case
involving waiver: was the waiver actually made; if so, was it done know-
ingly; and even if made with full knowledge, should it be permitted?
The rule should not be permitted to operate automatically upon the re-
quest of the defendant or his attorney. Some examination into the causes
and circumstances which have resulted in the request should be made by
the court, and discretion should be used in the granting or denial of
such a request.
KENN-r H. HANSON
Res Judicata and Conspiracy
The United States Supreme Court in Sealfon v. United States' has
recently sanctioned the use of res judicata in what may well become a
significant limitation upon criminal prosecutions for both conspiracy and
the crime of aiding and abetting in the commission of the substantive
offense. The petitioner was first tried and acquitted on a charge of con-
spiracy. He was then tried and convicted as a principal for aiding and
abetting in the commission of the substantive offense which was the
object of the conspiracy. But in a unanimous opinion by Mr. Justice
Douglas the Supreme Court reversed on the grounds that the acquittal
on the conspiracy count was res judicata and precluded punishment for
the substantive offense.2
Having rejected the common law doctrine that conspiracy merges into
the successful crime and that only the latter can be prosecuted, the fed-
eral courts treat conspiracy as an entirely separate class of offense. 3 As
13 Courts appear to be increasingly insistent that the defendant in a criminal
trial should not be permitted to waive fundamental rights, such as the right
of counsel, unless the accused is advised of his rights, and what the probable con-
sequences of the waiver are. See Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 44, 18 U. S.
C. A. following §687; Illinois Supreme Court Rules of Practice, and Procedure,
27A, Illinois Revised Statutes (1947), c. 110, §259.27A. For a complete discussion
to the extent to which the right of counsel is guaranteed under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Butte v. People of Illinois, 333 U.S. 640
1948.
1322 U. S. 575 (1948).
2 United States v. Sealfon, 161 F. (2d) 481 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1947). The Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the action of the lower court in withdrawing the plea
of res judicata from the jury, treating it as an issue of law, and ruling against
petitioner on his plea. It held that the plea of res judicata, which it seemed to
consider very similar to double jeopardy, did not apply. It distinguished United
States v. DeAngelo, 138 F. (2d) 466 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1943), where the principle
of res judicata was successfully invoked, without analyzing the records of the two
Sealfon prosecutions with sufficient thoroughness to see that the doctrine was similarly
applicable here.
3 Braverman v. United States, 317 U. S. 49 (1942) ; United States v. Rabinowich,
238 U. S. 78 (1915); 1 Bishop, Criminal Law (9th ed., 1923), § 787. A conspiracy
at common law was a misdemeanor; so when the substantive crime was a felony, the
former, the lesser crime, was deemed to have merged into the felony because the
same act could not be both a misdemeanor and a felony. The reasons for the
existence of the doctrine in England were: differences between the two as to punish-
ment; person charged with a misdemeanor was entitled to full privilege of counsel,
to a copy of the indictment and to a special jury which was denied in connection
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pointed out in Mr. Justice Rutledge's dissenting opinion in Pinkerton v.
United States,4 Congress has defined three separate classes of crimes: (1)
conspiracy to commit a crime ;5 (2) aiding and abetting or counselling
another to commit a crime;6 and (3) completed substantive offenses.7
The gist of the crime of conspiracy is an unlawful agreement between
two or more persons to accomplish an unlawful purpose.8 It is the agree-
ment which the statute punishes, so the agreement must be proved.9 But
the prosecutor need not show a specific and formal agreement, but merely
a unity of design or purpose or a meeting of the minds.10 In addition,
the federal statute requires proof of commission of an overt act in fur-
therance of the conspiracy.1 1 The overt act is not a part of the con-
spiracy and is not what is punished. 2 Such proof of some act done to
with a felony; forfeiture of property resulted from a conviction for a felony which
the Crown desired; etc. These reasons did not exist in this country and conspiracy
is expressly made a felony by federal statute. See Note (1942) 37 InI. L. Rev.
183, 184.
4328 U. S. 640, 649 (1946), which held that the substantive offenses committed
by one of the defendants were in furtherance of the conspiracy so that the other
defendant was also guilty of the substantive crimes, even though he was in jail
when some of the substantive offenses were committed, and there was no evidence
that he directly participated in any of them. A doctrine of a "partnership in
crime" was relied on to hold the defendant liable for the crimes committed by
his co-conspirator. The Court did not rely on the aiding and abetting statute which
would have served as a more sound basis. Mr. Justice Rutledge gave a vigorous
dissent, joined in part by Justice Frankfurter. Case criticized in Note (1947) 56
Yale L. J. 371; and Note (1947) 16 For. L. Rev. 275, for its introduction of vicarious
liability from the fields of tort and agency to criminal law. The Sealfon case may
possibly reflect a retreat from the Pinkerton opinion, which was also written by
Mr. Justice Douglas, although res judicata was not involved in the latter case.
5 35 Stat. 1096 (1909), 18 U. S. C. A. § 88; "If two or more persons conspire
either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United
States in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such parties do any
act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each of the parties to such conspiracy shall
be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than 2 years or both."
635 Stat. 1152 (1909), 18 U. S. C. A. §550: "Whoever directly commits any act
constituting an offense defined in any law of the United States, or aids, abets, coun-
sels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is a principal."
7 These are covered by the various statutes defining the crimes against the United
States.
8 Braverman v. United States, 317 U. S. 49, 53 (1942) (conspiracy to violate the
Internal Revenue laws); United States v. Gordon, 138 F. (2d) 174 (C. C. A. 7th,
1943) (conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act; Marina v. United States, 91 F.
(2d) 691, 693 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937).
9 Braverman v. United States, 317 U. S. 49, 53 (1942) ("A conspiracy is not the
commission of the crime which it contemplates and neither violates nor arises under
the statute whose violation is its object") ; Tabor v. United States, 152 F. (2d) 254
(C. C. A. 4th, 1945); see United States v. Britton, 108 U. S. 193 (1883).
10 Marino v. United States, 91 F. (2d) 691, 694 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937); Garhart v.
United Sta)tes, 157 F. (2d) 777, 780 (C. C. A. 10th, 1946). But, as the court pointed
out in United States v. Falcone, 109 F. (2d) 579 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940), mere associa-
tion with the main offenders without cooperation or agreement to cooperate was
not enough.
11 The statute is quoted supra note 5. This is in contrast to the Sherman Act
prosecutions, in which no proof of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy
to be committed is required, Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373, 378 (1913); see
Mr. Justice Douglas's famous footnote 59 in United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil
Co., 310 U. S. 150, 224 (1940). No attempt in this note will be made to cover cases
arising under the Sherman Act or in the field of civil law, the use of conspiracy in
the labor field, or state decisions.
12 Bell v. United States, 2 F. (2d) 543, 544 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924) (court said that
overt acts were material allegations in the conspiracy count but were not a part
1948]
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effectuate the agreement is required in order to give the would-be con-
spirator a chance to repent and withdraw if the conspiracy has pro-
ceeded no further than the agreement stage.13 Any act, even if not
criminal, in furtherance of the conspiracy will satisfy the requirement,
and may be supplied by any one of the conspirators.14
. Aiding and abetting under federal law is not a separate statutory class
of crime; for the aiding and abetting statute carries no penalty of itself,
but is only intended to abolish the distinction between principals and
accessories before the fact and make them all liable as principals for the
penalties provided for the substantive crime.15 But conceptually, aiding
and abetting in the commission of a crime would seem to be distinguish-
able from the actual commission of the offense and would seem to present
separate problems, as Mr. Justice Rutledge recognized in his dissent to
the Pinkerton case. For ease of analysis, therefore, this note will treat
it as a separate class of crime. By the use of the aiding and abetting
statute, it is possible to convict one for the commission of a crime which
he could not commit directly.36 The acts of the actual perpetrator of the
crime become the acts of the accessory or aider, and he can be charged
with having done the act himself. A person may even be indicted
directly for the commission of the substantive crime and convicted by
proof showing him to be an aider and abettor.17 The substantive offense
is sometimes spoken of as being a step beyond aiding and abetting and
covers the actual perpetration of the crime.' 8
Courts have been unable to draw sharp distinctions between the three
types of offenses. 19 With the change from one label to another repre-
of it); United States v. Halbrook, 36 F. Supp. 345 (E. D. N. Y. 1941); Note
(1942), 37 Ill. L. Rev. 183.
13 United States v. Britton, 108 U. S. 193, 204 (1883) (it "merely affords a locus
penitentiae, so that before the act is done either one or all of the parties may
abandon their design and thus avoid the penalty prescribed by the Statute");
United States v. Halbrook, 36 F. Supp. 345, 347 (E. D. Mo. 1941).
14 Braverman v. United States, 317 U. S. 49 (1942) ; United States v. Rabinowich,
238 U. S. 78, 86 (1915); Miller, Criminal Law (1934), 114; Grigsby, Criminal Law
(1922), § 421.
15 Vane v. United States, 254 Fed. 32, 33 (C. C. A. 9th, 1918) (court said: "dis-
tinctions which once existed between classes of offendors, accessories before the
fact, and principals, are abrogated"); Colbeek v. United States, 10 F. (2d) 401,
403 (C. C. A. 7th, 1926); Harris v. United States, 273 Fed. 785, 790 (C. C. A. 2d,
1921). However, punishment of an accessory after the fact is separately provided
for by statute. Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U. S. 607 (1946).
16 Barron V. United States, 5 F. (2d) 799 (C. C. A. 1st, 1925) (defendant held
liable as principal for violating the Bankruptcy Act although he could not have
violated the act directly because not a bankrupt himself); Haggerty v. United
States, 5 F. (2d) 224 (C. C. A. 7th, 1925) (held defendant, a federal officer, liable
as a principal for aiding others to violate the Criminal Code by pretending to be
federal agents and obtaining money falsely). Contra, Field v. United States, 137
Fed. 6 (C. C. A. 8th, 1905).
17 Vane v. United States, 254 Fed. 32 (C. 0. A. 9th, 1918) (overruled petitioner's
claim that he was being deprived of his constitutional rights to be advised of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him when he was indicted for robbery
and convicted of aiding and abetting in the robbery) ; Colbeck v. United States, 10
F. (2d) 401 (C. C. A. 7th, 1926); Harris v. United States, 273 Fed. 785 (C. 0. A.
2d, 1921).
18i Mr. Justice Rutledge's dissent, Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U. S. 640,
649 (1946).
19 The confusion in drawing the distinction between the crimes is heightened
by the looseness with which the terms of conspirator and accomplice are used inter-
changeably by the courts. Blanton v. United States, 213 Fed. 320 (C. 0. A. 8th,
1914) (there was no indictment for conspiracy and defendants were convicted as
[Vol. 39
8CRIMINAL LAW COMMENTS
senting only a matter of degree of participation in the planning and
execution of the crime, the dividing line becomes especially obscure when
one prosecution is for conspiracy and the other is on the theory of aiding
and abetting.2 0 The use of both theories in prosecuting a defendant for
one act of misconduct, with the resulting hardship on defendant, is illus-
trated by the Seaifon case.
Under the first indictment, Sealfon and others were charged with
conspiracy to defraud the United States by presenting false invoices and
making false representations to a ration board to obtain sugar certifi-
cates.2 1 The prosecutor based his case upon the false invoices and a letter
from Sealfon to one Greenberg saying that some syrup produced by
Sealfon was being sold at the Brooklyn Navy Yard. The government's
theory was that the defendants, in order to obtain additional sugar,
were trying to create the false impression that Sealfon's products were
being sold to the Navy. No evidence was introduced at the trial to con-
nect Sealfon with anyone other than Greenberg, so in order to convict
Sealfon of conspiracy the government had to prove an agreement between
him and Greenberg. The jury was instructed that Sealfon must be
acquitted if they entertained reasonable doubt that he conspired with
Greenberg. In its acquittal the jury must have concluded that the letter
was not sufficient evidence of an agreement between the two.
Sealfon and Greenberg were then tried for the substantive crime of
uttering as true the false invoices. Greenberg pleaded guilty, and Sealfon
was prosecuted on the theory that he aided and abetted Greenberg. Again
the prosecutor relied on the false invoices, the letter from Sealfon to
Greenberg, and practically the same testimony. Under the evidence in-
troduced, the only manner in which Sealfon could have aided and abetted
Greenberg was by writing the letter pursuant to an agreement between
them. This time the jury found Sealfon guilty. The Supreme Court
accomplices but described as conspirators); Baker v. United States, 115 F. (2d)
533 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940) (there was no indictment for conspiracy but an accom-
plice was described as a conspirator and convicted as a principal; Johnson v. United
States, 62 F. (2d) 32 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932) (no conspiracy indictment but a con-
viction as principals on evidence of aiding and abetting although defendants were
described as conspirators).
20 Louie v. United States, 218 Fed. 36 (C. C. A. 9th, 1914) (defendants forcefully
argued, to no avail, that the charge of conspiring to commit the act was the same
as the charge of aiding and abetting because the two crimes involved the same
character of cooperation, association, and union. But, the court said that it was
the province of Congress to define crimes and not the courts). See also dissent in
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U. S. 640, 649 (1946), cited supra note 4. Another
point at which the distinction seems nebulous is where the overt acts alleged in the
conspiracy indictment are prosecuted separately as substantive crimes. Pinkerton
v. United States, supra; Bell v. United States, 2 F. (2d) 543, 544 (C. C. A. 8th,
1924) (said the overt acts although material allegations in the conspiracy count
were not part of it so were not necessarily decided). Contra: United States v.
Bachmil, 270 Fed. 869 (S. D. N. Y., 1921); United States v. Glavin, 272 Fed. 985
(S. D. N. Y., 1921). However, the latter cases seem to be out of line with the
majority of the decisions.
21 322 U. S. 575 (1948). Greenberg manufactured syrup and sold some of his
product to Sealfon, a wholesaler. A salesman told Sealfon that if any sales were
made to exempt agencies, he could make larger purchases. Sealfon wrote a letter
to Greenberg mentioning sales to the Brooklyn Navy Yard although no sales were
actually made to the Navy Yard as such. Greenberg used the letter as the basis
for false invoices to present to the ration board although the letter was never shown
to the board. On the basis of these invoices Greenberg received replacement coupons




concluded, however, that the prosecution in the second trial had merely
attempted to prove the same agreement which the jury in the first trial
had found did not exist. Under the doctrine of res judicata, that issue
could not be relitigated, and a conviction of the substantive crime based
on that issue could not be sustained.
Petitioner pleaded both double jeopardy and res judicata in the lower
courts. He abandoned the plea of double jeopardy before the Supreme
Court, however, probably because the federal courts treat conspiracy as
a separate offense from aiding and abetting or the commission of the
substantive offense. The courts have pointed out that there must be an
identity of offenses before double jeopardy can be invoked.22 As the
court said in United States v. HaZbrook,23 "The prohibition of the Con-
stitution is against a second jeopardy for the 'same offense'; that is,
for the identical crime. The offenses charged in the two transactions
must be the same in law and fact." In determining whether the offenses
are actually the same although under different names, the federal courts
have generally used the "same evidence test."24 Simply stated the test
is whether the same evidence is required to sustain indictments for both
offenses. If the same evidence is not required, a defendant can be prose-
cuted for more than one crime even though they were committed in the
course of the same transaction.25 The courts talk in terms of whether the
same evidence is required to support both indictments and not as to
whether or not the same evidence is actually relied upon.25 Since con-
victions of conspiracy and of aiding and abetting do not require the same
evidence, the prohibition against double jeopardy, as defined by the
federal courts, could not be used by Sealfon.2 7
22 Louie v. United States, 218 Fed. 36 (C. C. A. 9th, 1914) (acquitted on con-
spiracy charge and convicted of aiding and abetting); Joplin Mercantile Co. v.
United States, 236 U. S. 531 (1913) and Moorehead v. United States, 270 Fed. 210
(C. C. A. 5th, 1921) (in both of the last two cases defendants were acquitted of
substantive offenses and later convicted of conspiracy to commit these same crimes) ;
Westfall v. United States, 20 F. (2d) 604 (C. C. A. 6th, 1927) (convicted of sub-
stantive crime and then convicted of conspiracy).
23 36 F. Supp. 345 (E. D. Mo. 1941).
24 Morgan v. Devine, 237 U. S. 632, 641 (1914); Comment (1947), 38 J. of Crim.
L. & Criminology 379, 383; Miller, Criminal Law (1934) §187; Note .(1940) 24
Minn. L. Rev. 522, 558-560. The Massachusetts court gave an oft-quoted definition
of that test in Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 434 (1871): a "single act
may be an offense against two statutes and if each statute requires proof of an
additional fact which the other did not, an acquittal or conviction under either statute
does not exempt a defendant from prosecution and punishment under the other."
25 Carter v. MaClaughery, 183 U. S. 365, 395 (1901) (siid that one of the
offenses required certain evidence which the other did not so "the fact that both
charges related to and grew out of one transaction made no difference") ; Westfall
v. United States, 20 F. (2d) 604 (C. C. A. 6th, 1927). A different result would
probably be reached if the federal courts applied one of the other tests used in other
jurisdictions: tests are, "the single intent test" and "the same transaction test."
See Comment (1947) 38 J. of Crim. L. & Criminology 379 for a discussion of the
three tests and their results. Grigsby, Criminal Law (1922) §207.
26 Wood-man v. United States, 30 F. ((2d) 485 (C. C. A. 5th, 1929) and Westfall
v. United States, 20 F. (2d) 604 (C. C. A. 6th, 1927); and United States v. Sealfon,
161 F. (2d) 481 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1947), where the court said that it would make no
difference if the record of the first trial had been introduced and the prosecution
had relied on it.
27 Carter v. McClaughery, 183 U. S. 365, 395 (1901); Berkowitz v. United
States, 93 Fed. 452 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1899) (the evidence necessary to convict on one
charge is not that neessary to convict on the other and may be wholly immaterial
at the second trial) ; Westfall v. United States, 20 F. (2d) 604 (C. C. A. 6th, 1927).
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The doctrine of res judicata, which Sealfon successfully invoked, and
the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy probably have a
common origin. They both rest in part on the two maxims that "a man
should not be twice vexed for the same cause" and "it is for the public
good that there be an end to litigation.''28 But the two defenses are not
interchangeable. 29 Res judicata can be claimed when questions of fact
or law have been distinctly put in issue in a previous trial and have
been directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, even
though the two offenses charged are entirely distinct. Thus, while the
defense of double jeopardy is available in a second trial only where the
same evidence is required to convict a defendant, res judicata can be
invoked where the same evidence was actually relied upon. Res judicata
simply means that a matter once decided will not be relitigated,30 and
its use is apparently available to the prosecution as well as to the
accused. 31
The first federal case to accept the doctrine wholeheartedly was United
States v. Oppenheimer, decided by the Supreme Court in 1916.32 The
government there argued that res judicata did not apply in criminal cases
except in the. limited form of the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against
double jeopardy. But the Court flatly rejected this contention 33 and
there and in subsequent cases has recognized the use of res judicata in
criminal law.34 The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
28 See Ex Farte Lange, 85 U. S. 163 (1874) ; Miller, Criminal Law (1934) §186.
29 See United States v. DeAngelo, 138 F. (2d) 466 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1943) ; and United
States v. Meyerson, 24 F. (2d) 855 (S. D. N. Y. 1928). Res judicata had been less
frequently used in criminal than in civil cases. Frank v. Mangrum, 237 U. S. 309
(1915) ; see United States v. Ralbrook, 36 F. Supp. 345 (E. D. Mo. 1941); Note
(1935) 10 Wash. L. Rev. 198.
30 It is, however, not always easy to determine what issues have been decided.
Note (1938) 7 Brook. L. Rev. 271, 283. "Finally, in ascertaining what issues were
actually determined, or, though not raised, were, by implication, decided, or though
decided, should not have been, and, even though decided, were immaterial, we
become involved in the intricacies of findings and refusals to find, in the nuances
of technical pleadings, and under the new practice permitting the omission of all
findings, in puzzling inquiries as to what was actually decided."'
31 United States v. Greater New York Live Poultry Chamber of Commerce, 44 F.
(2d) 393 (S. D. N. Y. 1930) (indictment for conspiracy in restraint of commerce,
court held that the prior conviction was res judicata as to fact of the conspiracy
and every matter essential to it); Ex Parte Dusenberg v. Rudolph, 325 Mo. 881, 30
S. W. (2d) 94 (1930) (conviction for robbery was held to be res judicata as to the
place where the robbery took place); Commonwealth v. Feldman. 131 Mass. 588 (1881)
(conviction for being drunk was held conclusive of drunkenness in a later prosecu-
tion for assault).
32 242 U. S. 85. Defendant was indicted for conspiracy to conceal assets from
a trustee in bankruptcy. Court held that it was barred by a previous adjudication.
This was in spite of the fact that the previous adjudication, which held that the
one year period or limitation of the Bankruptcy Act applied instead of the longer
period under the conspiracy statute, had since been held to be wrong in another
case, United States v. Babinowich, 238 U. S. 78 (1915). The principle of res
judicata was accepted by the Supreme Court in 1886 in Coffey v. United States,
116 U. S. 436, where the defendant claimed its protection in a civil action for forfei-
ture prosecution by the United States because of a previous acquittal in a criminal
suit based oil the same facts.
33 242 U. S. 85, 87 (1916) ("it cannot be that the safeguards of the person, so
often and so .rightfully mentioned with solemn reverence, are less than those that
protect from a liability for debt").
34 See Collins v. Loisel, 262 U. S. 426 (1927) (court said that it was not intended
that double jeopardy should supplant the fundamental principle of res judicata in
criminal cases); United States v. Rachmil, 270 Fed. 869 (S. D. N. Y. 1921) (court
1948]
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recently applied the doctrine to conspiracy in United States v. DeAn-
geo, 35 where the defendant was acquitted of a robbery charge and was
then prosecuted with others for conspiracy to commit the robbery. The
court held that introduction by the prosecution of some of the evidence
used in the first trial was prejudicial error. But since the government
in the second case had relied on some other evidence which had not been
used in the first trial and which might be sufficient to support a convic-
tion for conspiracy, the court did not dismiss the case but granted a new
trial.3 6
While the Sealfon case and earlier precedents do not define the exact
scope of res judicata in criminal law,37 they prevent the parties to a
criminal case from relitigating issues of fact which were determined by a
jury verdict in an earlier prosecution. The Sealfon nile is thus a desir-
able supplement to the constitutional prohibition against double jeop-
ardy, which, as already indicated, has been narrowed by the same evi-
dence test. 38 Moreover, where the alleged misconduct of a defendant
talked in terms of constitutional protection), United States v. Clavin, 272 Fed.
985 (S. D. N. Y. 1921).
35 138 F. (2d) 466 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1943). Accord, United States v. Meyerson, 24 F.
(2d) 855 (S. D. N. Y. 1928) (defense of res judicata was good in conspiracy trial
as the issue of participation in the scheme had been decided favorably to defendant
in the previous trial for scheme to defraud creditors); United States v McConnell,
10 F. (2d) 977 (E. D. Penn., 1926) (at both trials it was necessary to prove that
liquor permits were knowingly and unlawfully issued which had been determined
favorably at first trial).
36 Other opinions have considered the doctrine of res judicata in criminal law
and have recognized its applicability to situations in which there are indictments
for both conspiracy and the substantive offenses, while holding that the defense
would not lie because of the particular fact situations. Bell v. United States, 2 F.
(2d) 543 (C. 0. A. 8th, 1924) ; and United States v. Halbrook, 36 F. Supp. 345 (E. D.
Mo. 1941) (in both cases defendants were acquitted of conspiracy and then indicted
for substantive offenses which were overt acts alleged in first indictment-court
approved of res judicata, but said that although the overt acts were material alle-
gations in first indictment, the jury need not have passed upon them) ; United States
v. Morse, 24 F. (2d) 1001 (S. D. N. Y. 1926) (approved of res judicata but said
that upon a new trial of conspiracy charge it may be possible to sustain it without
contradiction of any fact already adjudicated). Contra: Fall v. United States, 49 F.
(2d) 506 (C. C. A. D. C., 1931) and Woodman v. United States, 30 F. (2d) 485
(C. C. A. 5th, 1929) where the courts held that res judicata would not lie unless
the offenses were the same.
37 In Mogall v. United States, 333 U. S. 424 (1948), petitioner was acquitted on
the conspiracy counts, but was convicted on the last count on the basis of the false
assumption that under the Selective Service Regulations the employer was under a
legal obligation to make reports to the local draft boards. The government now
conceded that the conviction should be reversed, but urged that the indictment should
not be dismissed since the prosecution might wish to try petitioner a second time
on the same charges as an aider and abettor. Court said it was not necessary for
them to pass judgment upon this procedure or the issue it might present as this
would properly be raised before the district court. Made reference here to the
Sealfon case.
38 In some criminal cases where the state courts have put their decisions on the
basis of double jeopardy, the courts were apparently thinking in terms of res judi-
cata. State v. Wheelock, 216 Iowa 1428, 250 N. W. 617 (1933) (three deaths re-
sulted from auto accident; court held that an acquittal of manslaughter for one of
the deaths necessarily meant that the defendants could not be guilty of manslaughter
for causing the other deaths); Spannell v. State, 83 Tex. Cr. App. 418, 203 S. W.
357 (1918) (defendant unintentionally shot his wife while shooting at and killing
another; court held that acquittal of murder of wife necessarily involves the find-
ing that appellant's act in firing at B was not such as to constitute murder);
Carson v. People, 4 Col. App. 463, 36 Pac. 551 (1894). Contra: State v. Fredlund,
200 Minn. 44, 273 N. IV. 353 (1937) (defendant's conduct killed two persons; court
[Vol. 39
